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Abstract 
This is a study of how the synergisms between cultural and structural factors, which 
played a major role during the historical fertility and nuptiality transition (first 
demographic transition or FDT), have continued to condition demographic innovations 
connected to the “second demographic transition” (SDT). The continuity or 
discontinuity from the “first” to the “second” demographic transition is studied for 
spatial aggregates over more than a century in two national contexts, i.e. Belgium and 
Spain. Special attention is paid to the role of successive secularization waves in shaping 
the geographical patterns of both transitions. The study also shows that the maps of the 
two aspects of the SDT, i.e. the “postponement” and the “non-conformism” transitions 
respectively, are shaped by different determinants. Explanations are offered using the 
“Ready, Willing, and Able” paradigm, which allows us to uncover the different 
conditioning and limiting factors involved. The “non-conformist” transitions (control of 
marital fertility during the FDT and rise of cohabitation and non-conventional family 
formation during the SDT) more closely mirror the history of secularization and the 
“Willingness” condition, whereas the fertility postponement aspect of the SDT mainly 
reflects female education and employment, or the “Readiness” condition. This 
generalization holds in both countries. However, in Belgium spatial continuity from 
FDT to SDT is connected to stable patterns of secularization, whereas in Spain it is 
linked to long standing differences with respect to female literacy and education. 
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1. Background 
Several books and articles belonging to the so-called “Princeton Fertility Project” 
(especially: Livi-Bacci 1971, 1977, Lesthaeghe 1977, Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986) are 
often cited as “cultural” corrections or complements to the classic economic and 
structural interpretations that dominate studies of historical fertility decline. One of the 
sources of inspiration (if not the main one) of the Princeton Fertility Project was 
without doubt William Leasure’s doctoral dissertation (1962) on the Spanish fertility 
transition. In this thesis Leasure showed that the classic indicators of urbanization and 
industrialization largely failed to account for the regional diversity in Spain’s fertility 
decline, and that regional and linguistic particularisms prevailed. This convinced A. J. 
Coale that it would be worthwhile to extend this Spanish investigation to the rest of 
Europe. The “Princeton Project” gradually emerged as a result, not as a cohesive project 
with preconceived objectives, but as a mere collection of empirical contributions from a 
variety of authors. Most of the research belonging to the Princeton project was 
performed during the late 1960s and through the 1970s, and several other and similar 
investigations were conducted during the following decades, including major further 
major studies on Spain and Prussia (e.g., Reher and Iriso-Napal 1989, Galloway et al. 
1994, Galloway 2009).  
Roughly 30 years after the completion of the Princeton studies, new demographic 
features have emerged with respect to household formation and fertility, and these are 
by now often collectively referred to as the “Second demographic transition” (SDT) 
(Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa 1986). The SDT has two main dimensions: (i) the 
“postponement transition”, referring to the upward shifts in ages at marriage and at first 
and subsequent births, and (ii) the “non-conformism transition”, pointing at the growth 
of unconventional forms of household formation (rise of cohabitation, of fertility among 
cohabitants, of single parent households, of same sex households, and of reconstituted 
families based on cohabitation). 
The succession of two waves of demographic innovation, referred to here as the 
first and second demographic transitions (FDT and SDT), begs the question of long-
term spatial continuity (e.g., Lesthaeghe and Neels 2002). More specifically, the 
question is addressed as to whether or not the leading regions during the FDT 
innovation would also be the leading ones at the onset of the SDT. Spatial continuity 
from FDT to SDT would be testimony as to the persistence of such long-term regional 
subcultures, whereas discontinuity would be pointing at new and recent developments 
in the structural and cultural determinants of the SDT
3
.  
                                                          
3 It should be stressed that at no point do we extrapolate the results of our correlation analysis from the 
aggregate to the individual level. Hence, the “automatic” label of “ecological fallacy”, often mindlessly 
attached to all spatial analyses, would be misguided in this instance. Furthermore, a spatial analysis is, of 
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In order to study the nature of cultural-structural synergisms over time and space, 
use will be made of A. J. Coale’s set (1973) of preconditions for innovation, otherwise 
known as the “Ready, Willing, and Able” trio (RWA). The empirical data will come 
from two countries: Belgium and Spain. Both countries are characterized by a high 
degree of both socio-economic and cultural (linguistic and political) heterogeneity, and 
hence they are ideal settings for studying regional (dis)continuities in demographic 
developments. 
Furthermore, we shall pay special attention to a reconstruction of the spatial 
aspects of secularization in both countries, as these are intimately linked to the 
willingness condition in the RWA framework. 
To sum up, the three objectives are: 
(i) to contribute to studies of historical continuity of demographic patterns; 
(ii) to obtain historical insights into the “genesis” of the SDT; 
(iii) to use the Boolean nature of the RWA paradigm to explain both continuities in 
some features and discontinuities with respect to others. 
 
 
2. The RWA model of innovation and diffusion of new behavioral 
forms 
At the end of the Princeton European Fertility Project that studied the historical fertility 
and nuptiality transitions, A.J. Coale (1973) came up with a succinct and catchy 
formulation of the three preconditions for a demographic transition to occur. This 
clearly superseded the more detailed narratives offered by the Princeton project’s 
various country studies, but caught the gist of their findings. Firstly, according to Coale, 
any new form of behavior must yield benefits that outweigh the costs or disadvantages. 
If there is no such economic advantage (= “Readiness” or R), then that new form of 
behavior will not be attractive and there will not be a breakthrough. Secondly, the new 
form must be “legitimate”, i.e. it must be culturally and ethically acceptable. If the new 
form of behavior runs counter to prevailing beliefs or to religious or moral rules, then 
the condition of “Willingness” (=W) will not be met. Thirdly, there must be adequate 
means (e.g., of a technical or legal nature) to implement the new form. This is the 
                                                                                                                                             
course, not the only way to look at historical change, but, in our opinion, still a salient one. Firstly, regions 
have long histories and traditions or subcultures that developed over centuries, and as such they transcend the 
life span of individuals. Secondly, if firms or institutions can be compared, so can other aggregates such as 
geographical ones, provided that the results are interpreted at that level. Thirdly, it is not because some 
theoretical paradigms, such as rational choice theory in sociology or neo-classic micro-economics, have 
shifted the attention to the individual-level decision making process, that all social science research should 
become “atomistic” too, and thereby lose out dramatically on historical richness. 
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“Ability” condition (=A). The three preconditions must be met jointly for a success S 
(i.e. a breakthrough of a new behavioral form) to occur: 
S = R AND W AND A  or   S=RWA 
where AND is the logical “and” or conjunction. Any failure of satisfying merely one 
of the three conditions results in an overall failure, i.e., there will be no adoption or 
breakthrough or transition to that new behavioral form. In other words, there are three 
necessary conditions, but a single one is not sufficient. The model is not one with 
separate, additional effects, but a Boolean one focusing on synergistic combinations 
instead (cf. Ragin 1987). The RWA model can be specified at the micro level as well, 
and this will bring out a few extra features dealing with the dynamics of innovation 
processes in general and of demographic transitions in particular (Lesthaeghe 
and Vanderhoeft 1999). These will be explained now in greater detail.  
We assume that any individual or household i would have its own set of three 
scores for, respectively, Ri, Wi, and Ai. These scores range in intensity from zero to 
unity. Zero then means: no perceived advantage at all (R=0), not acceptable on moral, 
religious, or other cultural grounds (W=0), and no means of implementation (A=0). 
Unity corresponds to: numerous advantages completely outweigh any disadvantages 
(R=1), perfectly morally and culturally acceptable (W=1), and no technical or legal 
barriers (A=1). A score of 0.5 corresponds to a point of indecision. The condition for 
a success is satisfied when all three scores move beyond that mid-way point, and are 
hence larger than 0.5. Another way of stating this is that each individual or household 
has a minimum score MINi which is the smallest of the three component scores Ri, Wi, 
or Ai: 
MINi= Minimum(Ri,Wi,Ai) 
Hence, any actor will only adopt a new form of behavior if his MINi > 0.5. The 
collection of individual scores obviously forms three distributions, respectively, for R, 
W, and A, but the collection of individual minima will add a fourth distribution. This 
MIN distribution will of course depend on the location and shapes of the R, W, and A 
distributions, but its mean will always be lower than that of the other three. The 
example in Figure 1 clarifies this point (cf. Lesthaeghe and Vanderhoeft 1999). 
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Figure 1: RWA model – examples of the location of the Ri, Wi, and Ai 
distributions together with that of the distribution of their minima 
(MINi) 
 
Note: Location of W (left), R (middle), and A (right) at one point in time (second example) and location of the distribution of the 
minimum (Ri, W i, Ai) (= dotted line). 
 
Note: Location of W (left), R (middle), and A (right) at one point in time (third example) and location of the distribution of the minimum 
(Ri, W i, Ai) (=dotted line). 
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In the first example, several cases have passed the 0.5 score on R or W or A, but 
nobody satisfies the RWA configuration where all three conditions are being met 
simultaneously. This can be seen from the distribution of minima, which does not have 
an upper tail that has moved beyond the 0.5 value. In the second example most actors 
know about proper ways of implementing the new form of behavior so that the 
distribution of A has already shifted to the right on the 0-1 intensity scale. With 
respect to readiness, the modal category is undecided (score 0.5) with half the 
population still not seeing a decisive advantage. But the majority in this example 
considers the new form of behavior as ethically or culturally unacceptable. The 
distribution of the scores that are the smallest of the previous three is located quite a 
bit further to the left than any of the other three distributions and only a small fraction 
has crossed the 0.5 point. Hence, few people have made a transition to a new form of 
behavior. In this example non-willingness obviously contributes disproportionately 
to the lower minima, and is therefore a dominant bottleneck factor or inhibitor. 
During a process of change, all four frequency distributions move from the low 
end to the high end of the intensity scale on the horizontal axis, with the distribution 
of the minima always trailing behind. The R, W, and A distributions can follow their 
own pace, and as they shift their variances will also tend to expand. At the outset 
variances are low since the vast majority has low scores on all distributions, and at the 
end of the transition variances will again diminish as more and more persons end up 
with high scores for every precondition. Mid-way, variances are the highest, and the 
same holds for the distribution of minima. Moreover, it is likely that at that time the 
MIN distribution also comes close to adopting a bell-shaped curve.  If this occurs, 
then our RWA model will produce a growth curve of adopters of new behavioral 
forms that closely resembles Verhulst’s logistic curve (elongated S-curve). Many 
innovations and their diffusion, from gothic cathedrals to engines, from epidemics to 
rumors, follow such a logistic growth curve. Furthermore, the logistic curve for an 
older innovation tends to taper off and reach a saturation-level of no further expansion 
when new and better technologies or innovations start growing and replacing it. Also, 
the latest innovation can entirely wipe out the older pattern, and in this instance there 
is a new transition. And, if such transitions succeed each other, there is no problem 
with numbering them as a simple means of identification. 
So far we have treated the shifts in the distributions of R, W, and A as 
independent. This is not likely to hold. Structural or materialist determinists, for 
instance, would commonly argue that R is the leading condition and that W and A are 
mere lagging derivatives. In this view, material conditions change first and people 
adjust their behavior to such new circumstances and opportunities. Subsequently both 
morality and technology will come under increasing pressure to adapt as well. There 
are, of course, numerous examples where other sequences hold. Breakthroughs in 
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contraceptive and reproductive technology, for instance, have opened up avenues for 
new interventions, and in this case A is the leading condition. Similarly, some cultures 
may have no objections to many forms of contraception and commonly accept 
abortion, and then the W-distribution will not be trailing behind the other two. To sum 
up, the sub-model with R being the leading condition and with cultural and/or 
technological lags may be frequently encountered, but it is by no means the only 
possibility. 
For each of the three diffusion patterns with respect to R, W, and A, we should 
expect there to be at least one focus of initial innovation from which the diffusion 
occurs until it meets social barriers. These barriers can be social class distinctions, 
cultural obstacles (e.g., religious differences), or communication barriers (e.g., 
linguistic borders). From that point on, socio-economic, cultural, and spatial variables 
observable at the macro level (e.g., for spatial units) will emerge as determinants of 
the process of differential spa t ia l  diffusion (cf. Bocquet-Appel and Jakobi 1996). 
To sum up: at present we have a model of innovation based on Coale’s initial 
model of three preconditions and capable of producing a logistic growth curve for any 
new form of behavior. Each of the three preconditions can be “individualized” and 
translated back to the macro-level in the form of shifting distributions. Moreover, 
these shifts and especially differences in the pace of the shifts can be linked to 
mechanisms of social and spatial diffusion of the “contagion” type, in which network 
contacts are essential. Then social group and/or geographical patterns emerge in 
which innovating groups or regions lead the way, and in which others follow 
depending on the strength of various types of barriers. Such barriers can exist with 
respect to any of the three preconditions, but since the MIN-distribution in the RWA- 
model is the crucial one, it suffices for only one of the three preconditions to be 
obstructed for the diffusion of the new behavioral form to be stopped or delayed at 
such a social or spatial barrier. This has important consequences: 
 
1. Those in the vanguard of a transition must score high on all three conditions 
and this will set them apart from the others, for whom at least one condition is not 
being met. 
2. Conversely, if one of the three distributions substantially lags behind the 
others, then many MIN-scores will be determined by the bottleneck condition, and the 
best correlates of the outcome will be indicators of that barrier. 
 
The final outcome of the use of the RWA model is that it expects both structural 
and cultural factors to emerge as correlates. The RWA specification leaves little room 
for disciplinary debates of the type “economics versus culture” (cf. Lesthaeghe 1998), 
or, by extension, for squabbles between economics, sociology, or political science. 
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Any one of these three can come up with strong “correlational” results, but the irony 
is that “victory” for a discipline can be claimed following the identification of a type 
of regressor (e.g., economic, structural, cultural…) with the largest and most 
significant coefficients, when in fact such statistical predictors could merely identify 
the slowest moving condition in an innovation and diffusion process
4
. The earlier 
types of analysis with “the buck stops at socio-economic structure” in sociology and 
social history and the subsequent “cultural turn” in the social sciences (see Sewell 
2005, esp. chapters 1 and 2) just lead from one form of reductionist fallacy to another. 
The RWA model simply recognizes that processes of social change are the outcomes 
of (i) socio-economic structures with their specific configurations of opportunities and 
constraints AND (ii) of the adaptive capacity of cultural scripts of legitimation, AND 
(iii) of policies affecting the technical and legal environments. The AND is again the 
logical conjunction, and the factors that cause leads and lags over time can vary 
widely. Some configurations are remarkably recurrent ones, but others can indeed be 
totally “historically idiosyncratic”. 
 
 
3. From the FDT to the SDT: The Belgian example revisited 
There are several reasons for revisiting the issue of historical spatial continuity in 
Belgium. The first one is that we now possess many more SDT indicators than could be 
used in the 2002 Lesthaeghe and Neels article. We owe this to Neels’ fertility 
reconstructions of 2006 for both cohorts and cross-sections on the basis of the 1990 
census, and to the Gadeyne et al. reconstruction of cohabitation trends and differentials 
starting from a retrospective question in the 2001 census. The second reason is that 
Neels (2006) showed that the Belgian SDT has two components with different spatial 
patterns: marriage postponement and premarital cohabitation followed the older 
historical pattern of demographic innovation, but fertility postponement did not. Also, 
in the US there was a partial disconnection in the spatial incidence of the fertility 
postponement and the non-conformity dimensions of the SDT, respectively (Lesthaeghe 
and Neidert 2006). More specifically, the states in the lower half of the two 
distributions were the same, but those at the vanguard differed: the North Atlantic states 
were the leading ones with respect to fertility postponement, whereas several western 
and Pacific states were leaders with respect to cohabitation. 
                                                          
4 An example will elucidate this point. Suppose that everyone satisfies the R condition, but many would not 
satisfy the W and/or A conditions. The correlates of the outcome would be connected to W and A and not to 
R, since this is a constant. The fact that the R condition is already satisfied is of paramount importance for the 
subsequent development of the process (necessary condition), but indicators of R will not be significant in 
any correlation analysis, and they are likely to be dismissed as “unimportant”. 
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Before turning to statistical analyses of the Belgian data, a short digression is 
necessary to elucidate the secularization history of the country. This history contains a 
few features that are essential to the understanding of the role of the W-factor and its 
relation to socio-economic structural determinants. 
 
 
3.1 The three secularization waves in Belgium: 1750-1970 
As in much of Western Europe, the first signs of secular, rationalist thinking emerged 
with the Enlightenment during the second half of the 18
th
 century. It was essentially an 
elite phenomenon (e.g., in Freemason lodges), but capable of being one of the driving 
forces of the Brabant Revolution of 1789, or the first attempt at establishing Belgian 
independence. This first wave of secularization gained much wider popular support 
during the French Revolution, and many urban parishes, especially in Liège, failed to 
observe the marriage ban during the so-called “closed periods” of Lent and Advent. 
Also, during the Napoleonic period and the period of reunification with the Netherlands 
(1815-1830), Catholicism remained under state control, but this did not imply that the 
secular ideas had penetrated in all regions of the country. As became very clear at the 
time of the Belgian independence in 1830 and with the concomitant Catholic 
restoration, numerous areas in the Dutch-speaking northern half of the country had 
remained staunchly loyal to Catholic clergy and doctrine. 
The early map of this first secularization wave can be constructed on the basis of 
the degree of non-observance of the marriage ban during Lent and Advent, i.e. the 
period of 40 days before Easter and the similarly “closed” period prior to Christmas 
(see maps 1, 2, and 3 for quintiles). The Napoleonic Civil Code had made a civil 
marriage obligatory and a church marriage optional. This remained so after Belgian 
independence, and hence the Catholic marriage ban was no longer an impediment for 
freethinkers or for couples in need of a “shotgun” wedding. The index used here is 
simply the percentage of marriages in March (approximation for Lent) and December 
(idem for Advent) divided by 2/12, or the proportion that would be observed without 
marriage seasonality. Hence, this MLA index equals 100 if no marriage ban is being 
observed, and becomes a much smaller number if the Church rules are being respected. 
For instance, during the last decade of the Austrian occupation the MLA index often 
comprised between 5 and 15 in Flemish parishes and around 20 in Walloon ones, 
meaning that the number of marriages was less than one fifth of the expected number 
for two months in the absence of seasonality. After the French takeover these indices 
typically increase to 30 - 50, and even exceed 100 for a few years in Liège (Lesthaeghe 
1991: 276-279). 
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Map 1: Marriages during Lent and Advent (MLA-index) in Belgian 
arrondissements, 1841-1847 (quintiles) 
 
 
As the MLA map with quintiles shows for the period 1841-1846, the impact of the 
first secularization wave is markedly stronger for the Walloon or francophone 
arrondissements (see appendix, map A 1, for their identification) of the southern half of 
the country than for the Flemish ones to the north. Even more strikingly, the degree of 
non-observance of the ecclesiastic marriage ban is pronounced in many strictly rural 
Walloon arrondissements, with those of Arlon, Bastogne, Virton, and Neuchâteau 
having higher MLA values than the emerging industrial arrondissements of Charleroi 
and Mons. Similarly, other Walloon rural arrondissements match the Charleroi value, 
and these are Waremme, Nivelles, and Philippeville. A correlate of this rural 
secularization in Wallonia is the strong allegiance to the Liberal party, which did not 
only represent the freethinkers among the higher bourgeoisie, but also those among the 
wealthier artisans and farmers. By contrast there was no such strong rural Liberal 
support in Flanders, and only in the larger towns of Antwerp and Ghent was there a 
militant secular presence. A major point of dispute in the initial Belgian “two pillar” 
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system (Catholic versus Liberal) was the staunch competition between the Catholic 
schools and the secular state or municipal schools. Jesuit and episcopal colleges of 
secondary education and the Catholic University of Louvain (reopened in 1830) 
produced the elites for the Catholic pillar, whereas the State universities of Ghent and 
Liège and the small Free(thinker) university of Brussels remained secular strongholds.  
After 1860 a third “pillar” was added, corresponding to the rising importance of 
the Socialist Party. This generated a second secularization wave in all major industrial 
and urban areas as well. The MLA map for 1860-1865 clearly shows how the three 
major Walloon industrial arrondissements (Mons, Charleroi, Liège) and the 
arrondissement of Brussels have MLA values in excess of 60, which is already 
indicative of a major weakening of the ecclesiastic ban. By 1881-1884 only five 
Walloon arrondissements have values below 60, whereas there are only two Flemish 
ones with values above 60.  
 
Map 2: Marriages during Lent and Advent (MLA index) in Belgian 
arrondissements, 1860-1865 (quintiles) 
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The double origin of secularization in Belgium before 1900 not only implies a 
leading position for Wallonia, but also that both rural and industrial or urban 
arrondissements are present in the upper half of the secularization distribution. In other 
words, there is only a modest positive correlation between secularization and 
industrialization/urbanization, which is a statistical bonus (low multicollinearity) when 
it comes to measuring the separate effects of secularization versus 
industrialization/urbanization upon, for instance, the speed of the marital fertility 
decline (Lesthaeghe 1977: 196-220; Lesthaeghe and Wilson 1986: 261-292). 
 
Map 3: Marriages during Lent and Advent (MLA index) in Belgian 
arrondissements, 1881-1884 (quintiles) 
 
 
Until the 1960s the map of secularization remains very stable in Belgium, as can 
be gleaned from the correspondence between the MLA map for 1881-1884, the map of 
the secular vote (% Socialist + Communist + Liberal) in 1919 (first elections based on 
universal male suffrage), the map for the secular vote in 1958, i.e. at the time of the last 
1881-
84 
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“school war”5, and the 1964 map of percentages of adults absent during the annual 
Sunday Mass census (see maps 4, 5, and 6). Noteworthy in this series of secularization 
maps is that the least secularized arrondissements are all located in Flanders and form 
two clusters: a western one in the province of West Flanders (arrondissements of Ypres, 
Diksmuide, Tielt, Roeselare) and an eastern one comprising the whole of the province 
of Limburg (arrondissements of Hasselt, Maaseik, Tongeren) and the adjacent Campine 
area (arrondissement of Turnhout). Moreover, as can be seen in Map 2, these two 
persistently Catholic regions were already in evidence from the 1860s onward. Equally 
noteworthy, however, is that the eastern cluster of Flemish arrondissements remained 
strongly attached to the Catholic Church till the 1960s, despite its industrialization after 
World War I, i.e. along the Antwerp-Liège axis (Albert canal) and the Limburg coal 
fields. 
 
Map 4: Secular vote for liberal, socialist, and communist parties,  
1919 (quintiles) 
 
                                                          
5 The 1958 “school war” erupted as a result of the Liberal-Socialist government’s attempt at restructuring the 
subsidy conditions of the Catholic school system. At that time many villages only had Catholic primary 
schools, and the government then also wanted to create secular counterparts. 
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Map 5: Secular vote for liberal, socialist, and communist parties,  
1958 (quintiles) 
 
 
The third secularization wave starts during the 1960s and corresponds to the 
disappearance of the hitherto Catholic strongholds in the northern half of the country. 
From then onwards Flanders catches up with Wallonia, and the marked contrast 
between these two regions, formerly coinciding with the linguistic border, becomes less 
pronounced. This is also the period of political “depillarization”, with the growth of 
alternative parties such as the Greens and later on the regionalist and populist right also 
(e.g. Vlaams Blok, Front des Francophones). During the late 1960s and 1970s all 
sources of authority are being questioned, and this applies to political parties, the 
church, the university system, the army, and the judicial system alike. Not only does the 
period 1965-1975 correspond to a major breakthrough of the “post-materialist” and 
expressive values supportive of female emancipation and the sexual revolution, but this 
is equally the era of massive female educational progression to full secondary education 
and beyond. 
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Map 6: Sunday mass absenteeism among the adult population (15+),  
1964 (quintiles) 
 
 
After 1975 the spatial secularization differentials are largely played out, but two 
centuries of spatial contrast in this respect still lingered on with respect to everything 
with a moral or ethical dimension. In other words, a set of regional subcultures along a 
conservative - liberal dimension still continued to be operative, despite the fact that the 
more strictly religious dimension is no longer a major part of it. On the other hand, the 
rise of female higher education and of female labor force participation outside the 
domestic sphere created a new dimension, equally springing up from the 1960s onward. 
As we shall illustrate in the next section, these two aspects will also be of major 
relevance for the unfolding of the various demographic characteristics of the SDT. 
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3.2 Spatial continuity: Indicators and covariates for the Belgian example 
To illustrate the spatial continuity over a period of almost a century and a half, we will 
resort to a series of both FDT and SDT indicators for the 41 (and later 43) Belgian 
arrondissements. The correlation matrix for these demographic indicators is 
subsequently analyzed via a classic Principal Component Analysis
6
, which extracts 
three orthogonal factors (Varimax rotation) that jointly account for 80% of the total 
variance contributed by the entire pool of indicators. The next step consists of linking 
these demographic factors to a series of covariates of both a structural and a cultural 
nature in order to identify the best correlates. 
The subset of demographic indicators related to the FDT contains all the Princeton 
indirectly standardized measures of marital fertility (Ig), of proportions married (Im), 
and of non-marital fertility (Ih) (Coale 1965: 207), computed for all the census dates 
between 1880 and 1970
7
. In addition, we also use the percentage of the total marital 
fertility decline that had already been completed by 1910 (delta Ig 1880-1910, 
Lesthaeghe 1977:109). Equally belonging to the FDT, but to its later years, are 
measures for the cohort of women born in 1931-1935, since the events of interest would 
typically have taken place in the late 1950s and the 1960s. For this cohort use is made 
of their mean age at first birth, their percentage of non-marital births, and their 
                                                          
6 In all instances where Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is used, axis rotations are orthogonal, and the 
resulting factors are uncorrelated dimensions. All factors (= principal components in our case) with 
eigenvalues larger or equal to unity were retained. We use the terms “principal component”, “factor” and 
“dimension” interchangeably. The term “factor” loading refers to the correlation coefficient between the 
factor and the indicator variable. Factors are composite measures or underlying dimensions of a set of 
indicators. Factors are constructed in such a way that they have means of zero and standard deviations of 
unity. Maps that present these factors use standard deviations as units of measurement, and divide the scale in 
quintiles. 
7 The Princeton indicators are all indirectly standardized measures, because of the absence of numbers of 
births broken down by age of the mother in most historical series of European countries. The Princeton 
indices all use Hutterite marital fertility schedules by age, h(a), to capture “natural fertility”, i.e. very high 
fertility in the absence of contraception. The four indices are: 
* Index of marital fertility Ig = observed legitimate births / Sum M(a).h(a) where M(a) is the number of 
married women by age, typically recorded in censuses. Age groups start at 15 and end at 49. 
 * Index of overall fertility If = observed births (all)/ Sum W(a).h(a), where W(a) are all women by age. 
* Index of illegitimate fertility Ih = observed extra-marital births/ Sum U(a).h(a), where U(a) are unmarried 
women by age. 
* Index of proportions married Im = Sum M(a).h(a)/Sum W(a).h(a), or proportions married weighted by 
Hutterite fertility. 
With these indices If = Ig.Im + Ih(1-Im) or in the instance of very low extra-marital fertility, If = Ig.Im. This 
allows for a simple decomposition of overall fertility If into a marital fertility and a nuptiality component 
respectively. 
The “speed” of the fertility decline (Lesthaeghe 1977) is measured as the decline of Ig between the value Ig 
(t) at the onset and a value at a later date Ig(t+x), divided by Ig(t) -.300, where .300 is taken as the “end” 
value of the transition. The measure gives an idea of the proportion of the total marital fertility transition 
already covered between the onset of the process and a later date. 
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percentages of ever divorced. Finally, four more indices, all measured in 1960-1962, 
pick up relevant information for the end of the FDT: the total first marriage rate 
(TFMarR), the total fertility rate (TFR), the mean age at first birth, and the percentage 
of the TFR that was realized after age 30 (capturing mainly higher order parities and 
unplanned births during the pre-pill era).  
The subset of SDT demographic indicators pertains to the rise of divorce, the 
postponement of marriage and fertility, and the rise of cohabitation and of non-marital 
births (mainly among cohabitants). For the periods 1969-1971, 1979-1981, and 1998-
2000 use is made of the classic total fertility rates (TFR), the mean age at first birth, and 
the percentage of the TFR occurring after age 30. For the years 1970, 1981, 1991, and 
1999 we possess the total first marriage rates TFMarR and the total first cohabitation 
rates TFCohabR. The latter could be computed from the 2000 census information on the 
year that first premarital cohabitation was initiated and the year of birth of the female 
respondents (see Gadeyne et al. forthcoming). Further information on cohabitation is 
available in the form of percentages cohabiting among women aged 20-24 and 25-29 
measured in the 1990 census, and also as an indirectly age standardized index for 2000, 
along with similar indices for proportions married and divorced (Deboosere et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, information has been added pertaining to the cohort of women born in 
1961-1965 and mainly occurring in the 1980s and 1990s: age at first birth, percent non-
marital births, and proportions ever divorced (Neels 2006) 
The socio-economic covariates essentially capture the processes of 
industrialization and urbanization, the degrees of literacy, and, for the second half of the 
20
th
 century, the rise of female secondary and higher education, along with their labor 
force participation. More specifically, for the periods 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1910 use is 
made of the percentages of the male labor force in agriculture (and for 1910 also in 
agriculture plus cottage industries), an index of urbanization and industrialization, and 
the literacy rate for the population aged 15-55 (Lesthaeghe 1977 160 ff.). This series 
continues with the urban percentages from 1920 to 1970. For the female cohorts born in 
1931-1935 and in 1961-1961 we have the proportions ever worked. For the older 
cohort, educational achievement is measured as the percentage at least completing full 
secondary education, and for the younger as the percentage having a post-secondary 
degree (Neels 2006: 87-88, 188-189). 
On the “cultural” side we have a series of measures of secularization and of 
linguistic homogeneity. The oldest series of secularization measures are the indices of 
marriages during Lent and Advent (MLA) for 1841-1847, 1860-1865, and 1881-1884 
(Lesthaeghe 1991: 271). The next pair is the percentage votes for secular parties 
(Liberal, Socialist, Communist) in 1919 and 1958, and the last measure is the 
percentage absent from Sunday Mass in 1964. Linguistic homogeneity is measured as 
the percentage of the population over age 15 that only speaks the language or dialect of 
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the region (monolingual - Dutch or Flemish in the North, French or Walloon in the 
South). A low degree of language homogeneity captures the presence of linguistic 
minorities in a given region. These were either the original population (e.g., Flemings in 
Brussels, German speakers in the arrondissements of Bastogne and Verviers) or 
immigrants (e.g., Flemings in Wallonia). The use of languages was no longer recorded 
after World War II, as being too sensitive politically. 
 
 
3.3 Statistical results for the Belgian example 
The statistical analysis consists of two steps. First, the set of demographic indicators 
mentioned above is being reduced to a much smaller set of dimensions (PCA, Varimax, 
orthogonal factor rotation). Second, the best social and cultural correlates of each of the 
demographic dimensions are identified. This gives a succinct description of the 
underlying structure of the entire correlation matrix. 
The three dimensions are clearly identifiable and tell the three basic stories. 
Factor 1 is the long-term continuity dimension of demographic innovations. This 
dimension identifies the leading and lagging regions with respect to fertility control and 
contraception during the FDT. But it continues to reflect a subset of SDT indicators, 
and more particularly all those associated with the weakening of the marriage 
institution: the rise of divorce, postponement of marriage, increasing cohabitation, and 
parenthood within the cohabitation context. 
Factor 2 reflects the historical rise and later decline of “traditional” non-marital 
fertility. This factor no longer has demographic indicators after the 1960s, which means 
that non-marital fertility from then onwards takes place in an entirely different context. 
This discontinuity essentially reflects the shift away from illegitimacy of non-marital 
births, not legalized by shotgun marriages and occurring to single women or adulterous 
married women, to extra-marital births mainly among cohabitants. 
Factor 3 has no clear deeper historical roots, but is a novelty typical of the SDT: 
postponement of parenthood among all types of couples. As already shown by Neels 
(2006), the SDT in Belgium has two separate components, one related to divorce, 
marriage, and cohabitation, and one related to postponement of parenthood. These two 
components have different geographies. The former reflects the long-term innovation 
dimension (see Factor 1), but the latter has a geography of its own. 
We shall now proceed with a more detailed investigation of each of these three 
dimensions. 
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3.3.1 Factor 1: Successive demographic innovations and long term spatial 
continuity 
Table 1 presents the long-term continuity dimension of innovation. High scores on this 
dimension for arrondissements reflect the presence of a leading position throughout the 
whole period from the 1870s until 2000, whereas low scores identify the 
arrondissements that were slow in adopting the innovations of both FDT and SDT. The 
left side of the table contains the best indicators of dimension one with their factor 
loadings (or correlation coefficients) of 0.700 or better. The right hand panel lists all the 
structural and cultural correlates of dimension 1 with correlation coefficients of 0.600 
or better. 
The prime continuity dimension exhibited in Table 1 has factor loadings on an 
impressively long series of demographic indicators related to the FDT: all indicators 
related to the historical marital fertility control, the departure from the restrictive 
Malthusian marriage system, and even the continued higher fertility past age 30 in the 
pre-pill early 1960s. The series then continues with indicators pertaining to the SDT; 
the rise of divorce, but above all the postponement of marriage in favor of premarital 
cohabitation. And by the 1990s procreation among cohabitants has joined the set as 
well. Note, however, the absence of the measures of fertility postponement.  
Aside from the 19
th
 century indicators of proportions of the male labor force in 
agriculture and cottage industries, all the best correlates of the demographic spatial 
continuity dimension are indicators of progressing secularization, already starting with 
the MLA index of 1841-1846 and continuing uninterrupted until the 1960s with the 
percentages absent from Sunday Mass. Also note that indicators of urbanity or 
industrialization after 1920 are not in this set. Within the RWA framework this is 
strongly indicative of the fact that it was the W-condition that was the limiting one. In 
other words, essentially the moral and religious objections to two entirely new forms of 
behavior, i.e. controlling fertility through contraception and replacing marriage by 
cohabitation, were constituting the decisive limiting conditions that shaped the 
geography of these successive demographic innovations.  
The map of the factor scores (expressed in standard deviations) of the 
arrondissements on the demographic continuity dimension is presented below (map 7). 
High scores are indicative of a leading position. Map 7 clearly shows that Walloon 
arrondissements, along with Brussels, were systematically at the vanguard with respect 
to all innovations captured by Factor 1. The language border is a well-demarcated 
barrier (see also Lesthaeghe 1977: 111-114). Moreover, many Walloon rural 
arrondissements are in the first quintile (cf. Philippeville, Dinant, Marche, Huy, 
Nivelles, Tournai, Ath), whereas the major Walloon industrial poles (Charleroi, Mons, 
Liège) are not. 
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Table 1: Long term continuity with respect to demographic innovations in 
Belgian arrondissements, 1841 – 2000 (principal component analysis 
results -- Factor 1) 
Demographic Indicators with Factor 
Loadings GE .700 
 
Best Social Correlates of Factor 1 with Corr. 
Coeff. GE .600 
1880 Index of Marital Fertility Ig -0.881  1841-46 
Marriages in Lent & Advent 
MLA 
0.645 
1890 Ig -0.898  1860-65 MLA 0.780 
1900 Ig -0.944  1881-84 MLA 0.821 
1910 Ig -0.938  1890 % in Agriculture -0.768 
1880-1910 
Speed of marital fertility 
decline 
0.849  1900 % in Agriculture -0.625 
1920 Ig -0.879  1910 % in Agric. + Cottage Ind. -0.652 
1920 Index of prop. Married Im 0.709  1919 
% Secular Vote (Soc + 
Com + Lib) 
0.897 
1930 Ig -0.784  1958 
% Secular Vote (Soc + 
Com + Lib) 
0.772 
1947 Ig -0.710  1964 % Non-attendance Church 0.698 
1960-62 % TFR realized after age 30 -0.842  1980s 
% Women ever-worked in 
cohorts 1961-65 
0.672 
1960-62 Total 1st Marriage Rate -0.706     
1961 Index of Non-marital fert. Ih 0.716     
1961 Total 1st Cohabitation Rate 0.850     
1960s 
% Women ever Divorced in 
cohorts 1931-35 
0.705     
1960s 
% Non-marital 1st births in 
cohorts 1931-35 
0.732     
1967-70 Total Divorce Rate 0.764     
1969-71 Total 1st Marriage Rate -0.790     
1971 Total 1st Cohabitation Rate 0.907     
1981 Total 1st Cohabitation Rate 0.947     
1989-91 Total 1st Marriage Rate -0.738     
1990 
% women 20-24 in 
Cohabitation 
0.764     
1990 
% women 25-29 in 
Cohabitation 
0.840     
1991 Total 1st Cohabitation Rate 0.898     
2000 Index Cohabitation 0.803     
2000 Index 1st Marriages -0.902     
2000 Index Divorce 0.750     
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Finally, the map also clearly shows the two Flemish regions that were 
systematically at the tail end of the innovation distribution. These correspond entirely 
with the zones that had the longest resistance to the first two secularization waves, i.e. 
the West Flemish zone with Ieper, Diksmuide, Tielt, and Roeselare, and the Limburg-
Campine zone with Hasselt, Maaseik, Tongeren, and Turnhout (see maps 1 through 6). 
 
Map 7: Factor 1 (quintiles): Long-term continuity dimension in FDT and 
SDT innovation in Belgian arrondissements, 1880-2000 
 
 
 
3.3.2 Factor 2: Historical illegitimacy in fertility and the urban-industrial 
connection 
The second dimension emerging from the Principal Component Analysis mainly 
captures the remarkably stable spatial pattern of out-of-wedlock fertility in the period 
1880-1930 (see Princeton Ih index), and later on the presence of higher proportions 
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married (Im) but lower fertility (see Table 2). Also noteworthy is the fact that there are 
no demographic indicators measured after 1980 loading on this factor. Hence it is fair to 
state that this dimension is more a historical one and unrelated to the SDT. Equally 
remarkable is that, also on the side of its correlates, only indicators of urbanity are 
identified up until 1970. Finally, note that the negative correlation with adult literacy in 
1880 stems from the fact that the Belgian industrial poles of the 19
th
 century, but to 
some degree also the larger urban ones, were attracting illiterate immigrant populations. 
But after World War II this negative relationship between literacy and urbanity was 
being reversed in tandem with the growth of the tertiary sector in the economy. 
 
Table 2: The historical dimension of non-marital fertility in Belgian 
arrondissements, 1841-2000 (principal component analysis results - 
Factor 2) 
Demographic Indicators with Factor 
Loadings GE .700 
 
Best Social Correlates of Factor 2 with Corr. 
Coeff. GE .600 
1880 Index non-marital fertility Ih 0.837  1880 % literate -0.621 
1890 Ih 0.891  1890 % urban 0.711 
1900 Ih 0.923  1900 % urban 0.756 
1910 Ih 0.901  1910 % urban 0.790 
1920 Ih 0.931  1910 % literate -0.633 
1930 Ih 0.838  1920 % urban 0.720 
1947 Index of non-marriage Im 0.713  1930 % urban 0.726 
1970 Im 0.785  1947 % urban 0.694 
1970 Index of marital fertility Ig -0.796  1950s 
cohort  1931-35 with higher 
sec educ 
0.628 
1969-71 TFR -0.773  1970 % urban 0.685 
1979-81 TFR -0.734     
 
Map 8 shows the geography of this second dimension. It strongly reflects the 
degree of urbanization and industrialization with high values for the Brussels – Antwerp 
axis in Flanders, and for the Hainaut industrial belt in Wallonia (Mons, Charleroi). But 
two other less industrialized arrondissements are also in the top quintile: Ostend on the 
Flemish coast and Thuin adjacent to the Hainaut industrial belt. By contrast, all the 
highly rural Walloon arrondissements of the Ardennes and several in the West Flemish 
rural belt are typically gathered in the lowest quintile. These were also arrondissements 
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with historically negative migration rates, a feature that contributed to the strengthening 
of their rural character. Finally, it is impossible not to notice that the language border 
plays no role here whatsoever. 
 
Map 8: Factor 2 (quintiles): Pre - World War II “illegitimate” fertility in 
Belgian arrondissements and its historical urban-industrial 
connection 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Factor 3: SDT fertility postponement 
The third factor identified in the Principal Component Analysis pertains exclusively to a 
feature that belongs to the SDT:  fertility postponement and differential catching up of 
fertility after age 30 (see Table 3). This is being indicated by the positive correlations 
with the mean ages at first birth from 1970 onward, and the percentage of the total 
fertility rate (TFR) realized after age 30 from roughly 1980 onward. Areas with high 
scores on this third dimension are then typically those with stronger fertility 
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postponement and subsequent fertility recuperation at later ages. Not surprisingly, these 
areas are also identified by two structural features: high post-secondary female 
education and high female employment rates for the cohorts born in the 1960s.  
 
Table 3: SDT fertility postponement dimension in Belgian arrondissements 
1950-2000 (principal components analysis results - Factor 3) 
Demographic Indicators with Factor 
Loadings GE .700 
 
Best Social Correlates of Factor 3 with Corr. 
Coeff. GE .600 
1950s 
% of 1st births prior to age 
25, cohort of 1931-35 
-0.773  1980s 
% women with higher 
education, cohort 1961-
1965 
0.807 
1969-71 Mean age at 1st birth 0.701  1980s 
% women ever in labor 
force, cohort 1961-1965 
0.601 
1979-81 Mean age at 1st birth 0.928     
1979-81 % of TFR after age 30 0.844     
1989-91 % of TFR after age 30 0.740     
1989-91 Mean age at 1st birth 0.881     
1998-00 % of TFR after age 30 0.809     
1998-00 Mean age at 1st birth 0.824     
 
Map 9 below shows the geography of the fertility postponement dimension. Along 
with the capital Brussels, all major Flemish urban areas and economic growth poles are 
represented in the top quintile (Halle-Vilvoorde, Leuven, Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges), in 
tandem with the better performers in Wallonia (Nivelles adjacent to Brussels, Verviers, 
and Arlon with its large population employed across the border in the Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg). Much earlier fertility is still maintained in the whole of southern Wallonia 
along the French border, but particularly in the Hainaut old industrial belt. The same 
also continues across the language border in the southern part of West Flanders. 
However, the Flemish area of less fertility postponement has fewer cohabitants and 
much lower fertility rates among such cohabiting couples than its Walloon counterpart, 
as the stark differentiation in Factor 1 had already indicated. 
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3.4 The Belgian experience in a nutshell 
The FDT in Belgium has two main components: (i) control over the level of marital 
fertility and (ii) the historical bulge and subsequent decline in “illegitimate” fertility. 
 
Map 9: Factor 3 (quintiles) -- the fertility postponement aspect of the SDT in 
Belgian arrondissements 
 
 
The best spatial correlate of the former was the degree of secularization, pointing at the 
fact that the bottleneck condition in the RWA trio must have been the W-condition or 
the religious and moral acceptability of contraception. The Belgian experience is 
furthermore one of considerable continuity, since the secularization dimension 
maintains a stable spatial pattern until at least the end of the 20
th
 century, and continues 
to condition the spread of the “non-conformist” aspects of the SDT (i.e. cohabitation, 
parenthood among cohabiters) as well. This implies again that the moral acceptability 
or the W-condition continued to be the limiting condition for this “innovative” aspect of 
the SDT as well. This is not surprising, given the fact that both contraception (FDT) and 
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cohabitation (SDT) were in the respective time periods viewed as “unconventional” or 
even “immoral”.  
The contrast is provided by the other aspect of the SDT; i.e. the fertility 
postponement component. This feature exhibits a totally different geographical pattern, 
with female advanced education and concomitant employment emerging as the best 
spatial correlates. Hence there is no trace here of the operation of the W-condition, and 
this is quite logical since postponing parenthood is not behavior that directly violates 
moral or religious prescripts. As a consequence, the geography of fertility 
postponement mirrors the R-condition, since better educated and employed women 
were typically in the vanguard of the postponement transition (cf. Neels 2006, for 
individual level data). 
 
 
4. From FDT to SDT: The Spanish experience 
The comparison of Belgium and Spain allows for a more revealing study of cultural and 
linguistic factors involved in the FDT and SDT. Both countries share a Catholic 
tradition and have similar roots of secularization (Enlightenment, Marxism), and both 
are linguistically heterogeneous. Yet in a host of other characteristics they are quite 
different. To start with, Belgium was the first continental country to move through the 
Industrial Revolution, whereas Spain was near the tail end of the distribution in this 
respect. In fact only two Spanish areas had an earlier 19
th
 century industrial 
development, Catalonia with textiles and the Basque country with metal industries. 
Secondly, Spanish landholding systems were characterized by the juxtaposition of 
“minifundios” of less than one hectare and permitting subsistence farming only, and 
“latifundios” or large agricultural enterprises operated by day laborers. Despite 
agricultural reforms, this duality survived well into the 20
th
 century, and it is one of the 
causes of another major distinction, i.e. political polarization. Indeed, despite a 
grounding of politics in similar religious and ideological divisions, political history is 
far more turbulent in Spain than in Belgium. Starting with the guerilla war against 
Napoleon there was a steady growth of polarization between Catholic and secular 
factions, culminating in the Spanish Civil War. Thereafter both cultural and technical 
developments were slow for most of the Franco era (1939-1975), i.e. until at least 1965, 
whereas the rest of Western Europe was building new industrial and infrastructural 
capacities on the ruins of World War II. In fact it is not until the end of the Franco era, 
the constitution of 1978, and EU membership that Spain is propelled at high speed into 
late 20
th
 century economic, technical, and cultural modernity. 
A number of these points need further elaboration, since they will be of major 
relevance to understanding the spatial patterns of the FDT and SDT in Spain. 
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4.1 The Spanish spatial secularization pattern 
Just as in Belgium (then known as the Austrian Low Countries), the start of 
secularization in Spain is linked to the Enlightenment and to the “enlightened 
despotism” of the last two 18th century monarchs (Carlos III and IV). During their reign 
the Jesuits were expelled (1767), the church was forced to sell off land and loan the 
proceeds to the state, and the private organizations to stimulate economic, 
philosophical, and scientific development were officially sponsored. These 
organizations, called Sociedades Economicas de Amigos del Pais, received legal 
licenses to foster their activities both in Spain and the colonies. After the guerilla war 
with the Napoleonic forces, Spain adopted a liberal constitution in 1812. 
During the first half of the 19
th
 century Spanish liberalism replaced the Ancien 
Régime through political struggles, revolutions, and civil wars. After the first Carlist 
war in 1840 and the traditionalists’ defeat, the church’s role in politics, economics, and 
social works was further reduced. By 1843 many episcopal sees were vacant, cathedral 
chapters were controlled by laymen, most male religious orders were banned, and more 
church property had been sold to service the public debt. Moreover, the tithes were 
abolished, priest became civil servants, and there was no curtailment of anticlerical 
urban riots. 
Under the reign of Isabel II (1843-1868) and later under that of her son Alfonso 
XII (1874-1885) and during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1921-1930) the church 
gradually recovered. During that period the main interruption was the First Republic of 
1873-1874, but that only constituted a brief intermezzo. However, by the end of the 19
th
 
century there is a further polarization of the political spectrum. Not only were the 
Socialists present on the Left, but so also were more radical factions with anarchist 
philosophies. Similarly, fascists enlarged the extreme Right, hitherto mainly made up of 
the strongly Catholic Carlists. Hence, at the turn of the century the extremist forces 
were growing that led to the events of the 1930s, i.e. the Second Republic and the Civil 
War. 
A first glimpse of the regional pattern of these divisions can be obtained from the 
index of marriages in Lent (ML-index) for 1900 and 1901. In contrast to Belgium, 
marriages during Advent were frequent in Spain, and only those in Lent were banned or 
discouraged. The ML index for Spain is then simply the percentage of marriages in 
March divided by 1/12 (assuming a flat distribution of marriages within the year), or 
simply multiplied by 12. The provincial values at that time span the complete spectrum, 
from virtually no such marriages (ML values below 25) to almost a complete non-
adherence to the practice of not marrying during the ecclesiastic “closed period” (values 
above 80). The strongly Catholic areas of Asturias and the provinces of Castile and 
Leon clearly show up as white zones on the map of the ML-values for 1900-1901 (Map 
10). Maps with other indicators, such as the number of inhabitants per clergyman in the 
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census of 1887 (Reher et al. 1993), or the number of inhabitants per seminarist in 
dioceses in 1963, show almost exactly the same areas as being Catholic strongholds. At 
the other end of the distribution there is a large north eastern zone of strong 
secularization, made up of Catalonia and adjacent Huesca and Zaragoza plus Rioja, and 
a large southern zone covering Andalusia (with the exception of Cordoba) and adjacent 
Badajoz, Ciudad Real, and Alicante. Also the western half of Galicia (A Coruña, 
Pontevedra) distinguishes itself by higher levels of non-adherence to the marriage ban 
than its Catholic hinterland. Finally, the Canary Islands equally fall in the top quintile 
of non-observance of the marriage ban. 
 
Map 10: Index of marriages during Lent (ML) in Spanish provinces 
(quintiles), 1900-1901 
 
 
Further into the 20
th
 century other indicators of secularization were constructed. 
For the Second Republic use was made of the percentage in each province of the 
elected diputados for the Left in 1931 and 1936 and for the Right in 1933 and 1936. 
Centrist diputados were left out in setting up these indicators. For the post-Franco era 
the indices are the percentage vote for the Left in the 1977 election (including regional 
leftist parties) and the percentage of marriages that were only civil marriages in 2001 
and 2009. Together with the ML-index for 1900-1901, these seven indicators were 
Index of Marriages in Lent
7.0 - 26.0
26.0 - 46.0
46.0 - 66.0
66.0 - 80.0
80.0 - 96.0
Demographic Research: Volume 28, Article 4 
http://www.demographic-research.org 105 
subjected to a Principal Component Analysis to extract the underlying orthogonal (i.e. 
uncorrelated) dimensions. It turns out that there is a clear distinction between a 
historical spatial dimension of “old secularization” and a newly emerging post-Franco 
“new secularization” with a different geography. The best indicators of the older pattern 
are, not surprisingly, the percentage of diputados for the Left in 1936 (factor loading or 
r = .853), for the Right in 1936 (-.757), percentage vote for the Left in 1977 (.704), the 
ML-index in 1900-01 (.671), the percentage of diputados for the Left in 1931 (.559), 
and for the Right in 1933 (-.505). The best indicators of the “new secularization” 
dimension are the percentages of civil marriages in 2009 (.947), in 2001 (.942), and the 
percentage of diputados for the right in 1933 (-.580). It can be noted that the 1977 
election results were still correlated with the Second Republic political maps (see also 
Linz and Montero 1999), but that the 21
st
 century indicators have become quite 
independent of the historical dimension. 
The two factors of old and new secularization respectively are presented in Maps 
11 and 12. Note that the scale of the principle components (factors) is expressed in 
standard deviations, and that the distribution has a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of unity. 
The comparison of Maps 10 and 11 show that the historical secularization 
dimension in Spain was quite stable until the 1970s. The core of the most Catholic area 
is made up of  Castile and Leon and the provinces of Castile-La Mancha around Madrid 
together with Teruel. This large central zone spreads further out to include eastern 
Galicia (Lugo, Ourense), Cantabria (Santander), Navarra, and the northern Basque area 
(Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa). The most secular areas are again the whole of the South, the entire 
Mediterranean coast (but not the Baleares), inner Catalonia (Lleida), and northern 
Aragon (Huesca). Finally, there is a band of northern provinces that is situated in the 
central segment of the distribution of the historical secularization factor, and it is made 
up of western Galicia (A Coruña, Pontevedra), Asturias, Rioja, Alava, and Zaragoza. 
Another striking feature for Spain is the strong connection between Catholicism 
and literacy. In 1887 the census figures for male analfabetism show a contiguous zone 
of percentages lower than 41% in the provinces of Castile and Leon and along a narrow 
Atlantic stretch from eastern Asturias, Santander to western Bizkaia. Intermediate 
figures form a circular band around this Catholic heartland to include Galicia and the 
northern part of Castile-La Mancha, and also emerge along the Catalan coast. But in 
much of the rest of Spain, and notably in the south and along the central and southern 
Mediterranean coast, male illiteracy was higher than 70% (Reher et al. 1993). 
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Map 11: The historical secularization dimension in Spanish provinces 
(quintiles of factor values) 
 
 
The map of 1887 for female illiteracy shows a similar pattern with levels below 
two thirds in Castile and Leon, Navara, Rioja, the whole of the Basque region, 
Santander, and eastern Asturias. By contrast, levels in excess of 85% of female 
illiteracy prevailed in the whole of Galicia and in the entire south-eastern segment of 
the country, roughly from Castellon to Almeria and further inland to Ciudad Real. In 
contrast to Belgium, where illiteracy disappeared almost entirely after the First World 
War, the Spanish low literacy zone persisted much longer (Vilanova-Ribas and 
Moreno-Julia 1992). Moreover, the concordance between higher literacy and better 
education on the one hand and Catholicism on the other meant that the civil service in 
Madrid and the elite of the Franco era were disproportionally overrecruited from Castile 
and Leon, thereby fuelling more antagonism between the political rightist center of the 
country and the more secular periphery. However, things changed after 1975. 
As stated before, Spain underwent a rapid and profound transformation during the 
post-Franco era in just about every single domain of life, from economic modernization 
and rising standards of living to much more centrist politics and the total disappearance 
of the extreme Left and Right alike (Linz and Montero 1999). Obviously Spain had no 
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more appetite for either the “nacionalcatolicismo” (Botti 1992) of Franco or for 
adventures with the far Left. On the other hand, just like in Belgium, regionalist parties 
and movements gained both ground and influence with marked degrees of devolution of 
economic power and with linguistic and cultural autonomy as a result. 
In tandem with the post-Franco modernization of its economic and social fabric, 
Spain also underwent a fast and profound new secularization wave. The proportion of 
practising Catholics (Mass at least a few times per month) drops from a plateau of no 
less than 90% during the 1950s and 1960s to just over 50% in only the five years 
between 1970 and 1975 (Requeña 2005). And from 1975 onward there is a further 
linear decline to less than 30% in 2002. The Spanish secularization is not only visible in 
the institutional spheres, but equally in profound changes with respect to individual 
ethics. For instance, to everybody’s amazement in the rest of Europe, Spain joined the 
vanguard countries in recognizing same sex marriages. It comes therefore as no surprise 
to witness a steady rise of marriages that have the civil part only and do away with the 
religious ceremony. For instance, for Spain as a whole, in 1976 barely 0.3% of 
marriages were civil ones only, but by 2000 this had grown to a quarter (24.1%) (INE, 
2005), and by 2009 to more than half (54.9%) (INE website). In some provinces this 
figure exceeds 60% (Baleares, Barcelona, Girona, Gipuzkoa, Lleida, Las Palmas, Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife, Tarragona, and Valencia). Hence, with the disappearance of the old 
politico-religious cleavage, a new spatial pattern emerges for the latest secularization 
wave. This pattern is caught by the second  principal component in our analysis, and it 
is shown in Map 12.  
The most striking difference between Maps 11 and 12 is that the whole south is no 
longer a component of this late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century secularization wave. This is a 
major factor in Spanish spatial cultural discontinuity. But, on the other hand, the old 
Catholic zones of Castile and Leon and Castile-La Mancha remained at the lower end of 
the distribution as well, so that there is one large contiguous area of slower than average 
“new secularization”, stretching from Burgos to Cadiz (north-south) and from Murcia to 
Caceres (east-west). 
The other half of the distribution geographically forms an extended “peripheral 
arc”, and contains both provinces that have always been at the vanguard of secularism 
and a number of newcomers. Obviously Catalonia remains in the former group, and so 
does the linguistically related Comunidad Valenciana. The Baleares complete the 
linguistically homogeneous part of this “new secularization arc”. The northern band of 
provinces along the Atlantic Ocean and the Pyrenees is also well represented in the top 
half of the distribution. This includes “familiar” provinces in this respect such as 
Huesca, Alava, and western Galicia. A set of relative “newcomers” such as the northern 
Basque provinces, Soria, Asturias, and eastern Galicia complete the “arc”. Finally, it 
should be noted that Madrid is not among the trendsetters in this latest secularization 
Lesthaeghe & Lopez-Gay: Spatial continuities and discontinuities in two successive demographic transitions 
108  http://www.demographic-research.org 
wave, but just in the middle of the distribution, and that the Canary Islands continue to 
be highly secularized provinces. 
 
Map 12:  The new secularization dimension in Spanish provinces (quintiles of 
factor values) 
 
 
To sum up, one of the major differences between Belgium and Spain in recent 
secularization history is that the former country displays a high degree of continuity in 
the spatial pattern of secularization, whereas the latter exhibits a clear cleavage between 
the old secularization pattern and a new one that has emerged since the 1970s. This 
distinction is obviously related to the fact that Belgium has been a typical 
“consociational democracy” (Lijphart 1968), i.e. governed by political “pillars” which 
had to form coalition governments from the very onset in 1830. The country has an 
intact track record of negotiated pacts, deals, and compromises between political elites, 
and therefore, unlike Spain, less polarization and no open and virulent conflicts along 
the secularization dimension. 
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4.2 The demographic dimensions of the FDT and the SDT in Spain 
As in the Belgian analysis, use has again been made of a large set of demographic 
indicators for Spanish provinces, respectively measuring features of the first and second 
demographic transitions. The correlation matrix for the total of 24 demographic 
indicators was again analyzed by means of a Principal Component Analysis, and this 
set of indicators could be reduced to five basic dimensions, three of which capture the 
FDT and two the SDT. These 5 dimensions are described in Table 4. 
 
Table 4:  Indicators and dimensions of the first (FDT) and of the second 
demographic transition (SDT) in Spanish provinces 
A. FDT – First demographic transition dimensions  
Factor 1. Late and slow 
decline of marital fertility, 
resistance to fertility control, 
1887-1960. 
 Factor 2: Prevalence of 
earlier female marriage, as 
opposed to Malthusian 
pattern of late marriage and 
higher definitive celibacy, 
1887-1930. 
 Factor 3: Historical pattern 
of fertility outside wedlock, 
1887-1960. 
Princeton index of 
marital fertility (Ig 
1887) 
0.78  
Princeton index of 
proportions married 
(Im 1887) 
0.94  
Princeton index of 
illegitimate fertility (Ih 
1887) 
0.89 
Ig 1900 0.84  Im 1900 0.92  Ih 1900 0.92 
Ig 1930 0.85  Im 1930 0.85  Ih 1930 0.74 
Ig 1950 0.90     Ih 1960 0.58 
Ig 1960 0.74       
% total marital fertility 
transition completed 
by 1930 
-0.60       
 
  
Lesthaeghe & Lopez-Gay: Spatial continuities and discontinuities in two successive demographic transitions 
110  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Table 4:  (Continued) 
B. SDT – Second demographic transition dimensions 
Factor 4: The new postponement of 
marriage and parenthood, 1995-2001. 
 
Factor 5: SDT - Non-conformist family 
formation pattern, 2001-2002.  
Women not yet in a union at age 
25-29, 2001 
0.82  Pct unions cohabiting, 2001 
0.64  
Fertility postponement index (fert 
30+/ fert 20-29 ), 2001 
0.93  pct births non-marital, 2001 0.78  
Women childless 25-29, 2001 0.93  
pct children <15 in one-parent 
household, 2001 0.45  
Women childless 30-34, 2001 0.91  total fertility TFR, 2002 0.65  
Total fertility rate TFR, 1995 0.72     
 
The dimensions described above in table 4 clearly show that we are essentially 
dealing with five different features. The resistance to fertility control, the pattern of 
early marriage, and the historical levels of extra-marital fertility are the three classic 
ingredients of the FDT, whereas the postponement of fertility and the rise of “non-
conformist” family formation are the two SDT components. 
 
 
4.3 Statistical results for the Spanish example 
We shall now discuss the maps for each of the five demographic dimensions of the 
Spanish FDT and SDT, and make the link with a set of socio-economic and cultural 
spatial indicators. 
 
 
4.3.1 The FDT marital fertility transition 
Following up on the earlier studies of J. W. Leasure (1962) and M. Livi-Bacci (1968), a 
detailed analysis of the Spanish historical fertility transition has been offered by Reher 
and Iriso-Napal (1987, 1989). Much of what follows here on the FDT therefore largely 
echos their findings. However, when it comes to a multivariate analysis in section 5, 
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another strategy will be followed which will essentially eliminate the multicollinearity 
problem that affected the outcomes of earlier studies.
8
  
Map 13 depicts the spatial pattern of the Spanish marital fertility transition. The 
factor captures the marital fertility levels as measured through the Princeton Ig measure, 
from 1887 through 1960, and the relative speed of the decline of marital fertility 
between 1887-1900 and 1930. For the last indicator, the Ig-levels at the onset were 
chosen to be either those for 1887 or for 1900, depending on which was highest. This 
choice was made in order to accommodate the fact that several provinces still had a 
fertility increase between 1887 and 1900. Furthermore, we take 1930 as a good 
approximation of the mid-transition point, since the 1920 Ig levels, as used by Reher 
and Iriso-Napal, are still very high. For instance, for the rural parts of provinces the 
mean Ig level was .66 in 1887, .68 in 1900, and still .62 in 1920. (Reher and Iriso-Napal 
1989: 408). For Spain as a whole these values were respectively .65, .65, and .59. The 
value for 1930 is .54, which is still fairly high but about the halfway value between Ig = 
.65 in 1900 and .40 in 1960. (Coale and Treadway 1986: appendix table: 145). 
Aside from Madrid, one major set of contiguous provinces stands out as the 
Spanish region with an early fertility decline. This zone comprises the entire Catalan-
Valencian linguistic area, i.e. the three Catalan provinces, the three provinces of the 
Comunidad Valenciana, and the Baleares Islands. The three adjacent provinces of 
Aragon are also part of the faster fertility transition zone. In the top quintile we also 
find the two Canary Islands provinces. Spearheading the marital fertility decline were 
the provinces of Barcelona, Tarragona, and Castellon. Taking an Ig value of .30 (or 30 
percent of Hutterite fertility) as the endpoint of the transition, these three provinces had 
already covered two thirds of the entire marital fertility transition by 1930. 
The areas belonging to the latest and slowest quintiles are all located along a north-
south axis stretching from Santander (Cantabria) to Badajoz, and comprising all of 
Castile and Leon and Extremadura. Navarra is also part of this slower zone, and so are 
Ciudad Real, Jaen, and Cordoba in the south. The following provinces had not even 
completed 10% of the transition by 1930: Avila, Burgos, Cordoba, Cuenca, Granada, 
Navarra, Salamanca, Segovia, and Zamora.  
The best correlates of a fast marital fertility transition (the opposite to what is 
shown in the map above) were the following: the percentage employed in industries in 
1900 (r = .425), the urban percentage in 1900 (.309), the percentage of diputados for the 
left in 1936 (.316) and for the right at the same elections (-.359). As expected, these 
correlations are all very modest, and that perfectly echoes the findings of Leasure 
(1962) and of Reher and Iriso-Napal (1989). In the analysis of the latter authors other 
                                                          
8 The articles by Reher and Iriso-Napal present both zero-order correlations (r) and standardized regression 
coefficients (beta). This is a very fortunate decision since the comparison of values of r and beta is very 
instructive in assessing the seriousness of the multicollinearity problem. 
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variables have also been added, such as infant and childhood mortality rates, the 
presence of day laborers, and a measure of net migration. In accounting for the Ig-
values of rural parts of provinces in 1920, they find correlations for these three extra 
indicators of, respectively, .304, -.341 and -.511. 
 
Map 13: FDT - late and slow decline of marital fertility, 1887-1960 
 
 
The positive correlation between higher marital fertility and higher infant and 
childhood mortality can be explained, as done by the authors, by the impact of 
breastfeeding differentials. Shorter durations of breastfeeding lead to both less spacing 
of births and higher fertility and to higher mortality prior to age 5. A breastfeeding map 
for Spain could further elucidate this point.
9
 The negative correlation with day laborers 
essentially captures the lower marital fertility in a number of southern provinces with 
agricultural structures dominated by latifundio. The negative correlation between net 
migration and marital fertility in rural areas points in the direction of selectivity, with 
traditionalism being reinforced by a loss of population. Reher and Iriso-Napal also find 
a negative correlation (-.503) between the leftist vote in 1936 and rural fertility levels, 
                                                          
9 For a further analysis of the link with infant mortality, see F. Gil-Alonso 2010. 
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which is equally reflected in our findings for the marital fertility factor for provinces as 
a whole.  
We also explored the effect of primogeniture as a characteristic of the inheritance 
system. The protection of property for the oldest son could indeed explain why 
Catalonia was so far ahead with its fertility decline. However, the map produced by 
Zapatero Molinero (1977: 19) shows that the primogeniture zone stretched westward to 
include Huesca, Navarra, and the Basque country as well. Furthermore an Asturian-
Galician band also exists with a dominance of primogeniture or testamentary 
preference. Some of these regions (e.g., Huesca) were equally at the forefront of 
fertility control, but others were not at all (e.g., Navarra). Moreover, the three provinces 
with fast fertility decline in the Comunidad Valenciana all had equal division as the 
dominant inheritance principle. 
The conclusion from this exploration is that there is a modest link of the Spanish 
marital fertility transition to industrialization, urbanization, and secularization, but that 
major regional particularities prevail, even if further controls are introduced for 
inheritance or land tenure systems. 
 
 
4.3.2. The FDT nuptiality system 
There are major differences between Belgium and Spain with respect to the historical 
patterns and changes in their respective nuptiality systems. Belgium fell entirely within 
the broader western European zone with the dominance of the Malthusian system of 
late and non-universal marriages during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries. This was not the 
case for Spain, where the Malthusian system only prevailed in the Atlantic provinces 
(see Map 14 and Reher 1991). In these areas the Hutterite fertility weighted Princeton 
index Im of proportions of women married at ages 15 to 49 are in the range of .440 to 
.480 in 1887 (Reher et al. 1993: 227). At the other end of the spectrum, Im values in 
1887 are as high as .680 in several Spanish provinces (e.g., Avila, Huesca, Segovia) 
(ibidem), which is indicative of much earlier marriage. By contrast, the Im levels for 
Belgian arrondissements in 1880 were systematically lower than those in Spain, and 
only in the .350 to .500 range, reflecting the impact of stronger Malthusian control. 
A direct consequence of this distinction at the onset is that the proportion of 
married women rose during the FDT in Belgium as the Malthusian system gradually 
receded under the impact of the growth of wage labor in industrial sectors (Lesthaeghe 
1977). By contrast, in Spain the proportions married experienced a modest decline. In 
terms of the Princeton index Im, there was a decrease from .575 in 1887 for Spain as a 
whole to .504 in 1930, and in terms of mean ages at first marriage for women there was 
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a small increase from 24.4 in 1900 to 24.7 in 1930 (Muñoz-Perez and Recaño-Valverde 
2011). 
The spatial nuptiality pattern is shown in Map 14 and captures the Im values for 
1887, 1900, and 1930. The best correlates of this map deal with the land tenure system. 
The minifundio indicator, i.e. percent of plots of less than one hectare in 1962 (INE, 
1964) and the latifundio indicator of plots of over 100 hectares have correlation 
coefficients of -.594 and .395, respectively. This reflects the correspondence between 
late marriage and small-scale subsistence farming in Galicia and Asturias, and much 
earlier marriage among the rural proletariat in central and southern regions with large-
scale agricultural enterprises. The correlation is not stronger because other areas existed 
with small scale farming along the Mediterranean coast, but these did not necessarily 
have the late nuptiality pattern (e.g. Alicante, Murcia). 
 
Map 14: FDT - earlier female age at marriage, high proportion of women 
married 15-49, 1887-1930 
 
 
But the land tenure system does not tell the whole story. At least as important, but 
connected to population pressure in densely populated rural areas, is the imbalance in 
the sex ratios at marriageable ages, say 20-29. This ratio of men 20-29 to women 20-29 
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for all the Atlantic provinces, from Gipuzkoa to all of Galicia and also including Leon 
and Zamora, shows a large deficit of men, thereby reducing the marriage possibilities of 
women. Hence selective outmigration of men depressed the values of Im considerably. 
This feature, already described for 1887 (Reher et al. 1993), continued to exist well into 
the 20
th
 century.  
The Belgian values of Im in the arrondissements and towns show very similar 
effects of selective migration by gender and marital status (Lesthaeghe 1977: 80-87). 
Densely settled rural areas with cottage industries and small scale agriculture similarly 
lose young men and have the lowest Im values. The older urban areas, which offer 
employment opportunities for single women in textile industries, education, and 
domestic service, have higher overall female employment rates and a shortage of single 
men, which reduces the Im values as well. On the other hand, the new industrial towns 
with heavy industries and growing suburbs had ample male-oriented employment 
opportunities, a surplus of single men, and hence a favorable market for women, and 
much higher Im values as a result (often above .550) (Ibidem: 84-85). 
To sum up, in Belgium the gradual abandonment of the late Malthusian marriage 
pattern was a major ingredient of the FDT and there is a steady drop in ages at marriage 
until the mid-1960s. In Spain, the situation is much more stable until the 1930s, and the 
decline in marital fertility is not really accompanied by a nuptiality transition as in 
northern or western Europe. Instead, nuptiality patterns partially continued to reflect the 
strong differences in land tenure systems, with later marriage in areas with peasant 
agriculture, and early marriage in areas with latifundio and a rural proletariat.  
In both countries there were major additional “marriage market” effects caused by 
selective migration by gender and marital status. Whenever migration creates a surplus 
of young women, Im values are depressed, and the opposite holds when a surplus of 
young men is produced. There is a strong push for male outmigration in areas with 
small-scale peasant agriculture and high population densities, leading to low Im values, 
and hence the “land tenure – migration” link is of extra importance. 
 
 
4.3.3 The “illegitimacy” dimension of the FDT 
Out-of-wedlock fertility levels in Spain and Belgium were low to very low. For Spain 
as a whole the Princeton index of illegitimacy Ih amounted to .041 in 1887 and it 
declined to barely .038 in 1930 (Coale and Treadway 1986: 145). The zones with the 
highest levels of illegitimacy, i.e. with Ih values between .060 and .085, are all in the 
south. The other areas with higher illegitimacy (Ih values between .050 and.065) are 
located in Galicia. Finally there are also such values in Madrid, and more surprisingly 
in the province of Valladolid.  
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The major correlates of higher illegitimacy are the percentages urban in 1900 and 
1950, with correlation coefficients of .468 and .412 respectively. This is essentially the 
same finding as in the case of Belgian illegitimacy. It is also possible that the higher 
illegitimacy in southern Spanish provinces reflects the remnants of unmarried 
cohabitation, but the overall correlation with, for instance, the presence of latifundio is 
not materializing because of other areas with similarly higher illegitimacy levels, 
reflecting other features such as urbanization. 
 
Map 15: FDT - high out-of-wedlock fertility, 1887-1960 
 
 
 
4.3.4 The postponement dimension of the SDT 
As indicated in Table 4, the SDT postponement dimension is essentially capturing the 
proportions of women who are still not in a union at ages 25-29, the proportions of 
women still childless in the age groups 25-29 and 30-34, and the fertility postponement 
index, which is the ratio of the sum of the age-specific fertility rates above age 30 over 
that in the age bracket 20-29. All these indicators pertain to the year 2001. Another 
good correlate of this factor was lower total fertility as measured by the TFR in 1995. 
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The geography of the SDT postponement dimension is displayed in Map 16. The 
slowest transitions into marriage and especially to parenthood are found in a large 
contiguous set of provinces. The core of it is made up of Navarra, the Basque region, 
Rioja, Soria, Burgos, Palencia, Valladolid, and Madrid. Around this core is another 
circle of provinces with strong SDT postponement, so that the whole of Castile and 
Leon is covered, together with northern and central Aragon and the province of 
Guadalajara. The outlier here is Barcelona, which is the only province with stronger 
postponement outside that contiguous area. 
The postponement is less pronounced in the rest of Spain, and least of all in 
Extremadura, the adjacent part of Castile & Leon, Andalusia (minus Seville), and 
Murcia. At the other end of the country Pontevedra in Galicia also falls within the 
lowest quintile of this postponement dimension. 
 
Map 16: SDT - postponement of marriage, parenthood, and overall fertility, 
1995-2001 (quintiles) 
 
 
 
The most striking correlates of the SDT postponement factor all deal with literacy 
and education: the total population literacy rate in 1887 (r = .814), the same rate for the 
population aged 10+ in 1910 (.798), the percentage of women 10+ still incapable of 
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reading and writing as late as 1986 (-.806), and the much more recent percentage of 
women 16+ in 2001 with more than complete secondary education (.797). Hence there 
is a striking continuity over time of the impact of the education factor from illiteracy in 
1887 to tertiary education in 2001. In order to bring this out even more clearly, Figure 1 
shows the scattergram illustrating the location of the provinces in this spatial correlation 
between the SDT dimension and population literacy measured as early as in the 1887 
census. 
 
Figure 2: Scattergram for the correlation (r = +0.814) between the SDT 
postponement dimension (1995-2001) and the percentage literate in 
the total population in 1887 
 
 
The other major correlates of the SDT postponement dimension are equally 
correlates of the literacy/education variables, and, as outlined before, they will also 
reflect the connection between education and a stronger historical attachment to 
Catholicism. Hence, the SDT postponement factor also correlates with the number of 
persons per clergyman in 1887 (-.693) and with the index of marriages in Lent in 1900-
1901 (-.415). Better education for women is also reflected in higher employment rates, 
and hence these rates for women 25-29 and 30-34 in 2001 are good predictors of SDT 
postponement (r = .685 and .672, respectively). Finally, the daily press circulation in 
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1995, another indicator of the population educational level, is also a fair correlate (.511) 
of starting marriage and parenthood later.  
 
 
4.3.5 The “non-conformism” dimension of the SDT 
The “non-conformism” dimension of the SDT is captured by four indicators for the 
period 1995-2002: the percentage of all births outside marriage, the percentage of 
cohabiting unions, the abortion rate for women 15-44, and the percentage of children 
living in single parent households (see table 4). Other strong demographic correlates of 
this dimension were higher divorce+separation rates for women 15-44 in 1991 and 
2001 (r = .689 and .651, respectively).
10
 
Non-conformism in current family formation is found in several zones, as shown 
in Map 17.  
The first zone stretches along the entire Mediterranean coast, from the whole of 
Catalonia to Cadiz, and including the Baleares Islands. The second one comprises the 
Basque provinces, Navarra and Rioja. The third area is made up of Madrid and adjacent 
Guadalajara, and the fourth one of the Canary Islands. 
The most significant correlates of this SDT non-conformity factor essentially 
capture the degree of urbanity and concomitant employment in the service sector, in 
tandem with the “new secularization” dimension. In more detail, the urbanity dimension 
shows up in correlations with the percentage employed in the service sector in 1995 (r = 
.755), in agriculture in 1995 (-.678), the percentage of women 16+ with secondary 
education in 2001 (.625) and their activity rate in 2002 (.608). The effect of the “new 
secularization arc” is reflected in the correlations between the SDT non-conformity 
factor and the percentages with only civil marriages in 2001 (r = .529) and 2009 (r = 
.519). But there are also echoes of the past. The urban percentages in 1900 and 1950 
have a correlation with the SDT non-conformity factor of .463 and .458, and the index 
of marriages in Lent of 1900-01 a correlation of .437. 
 
  
                                                          
10 See also Cabré-Pla and Menacho-Montes 2007. 
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Map 17: SDT – non-conformist family formation (cohabitation, out-of 
wedlock fertility, single parent household, abortion), 1995-2002 
 
 
 
5. A common multivariate analysis strategy for both countries  
So far we have only discussed patterns of zero order correlations between the various 
demographic dimensions and their predictors in Belgium and Spain, but a directly 
comparable multivariate analysis is needed to help us further. One of the problems of 
earlier detailed work presented by Reher and Iriso-Napal (1987, 1989) is the presence 
of strong multicollinearity. This emerges when predictors are fairly strongly correlated 
between themselves, and particularly so when such predictor intercorrelations are 
stronger than those with the dependent variable. Multicollinearity causes standardized 
beta-coefficients in multiple regressions to be substantially different from the zero-order 
correlations, and also causes them to have enlarged standard errors. In other words, 
estimates of net effects become unstable. In the instance of Spain this is a special worry, 
because the correlations between the presumed structural or cultural determinants and 
the FDT demographic dimensions are not very strong to start with. Another point is that 
Factor score
-1.93 - -0.84
-0.84 - -0.12
-0.12 - 0.16
0.16 - 0.79
0.79 - 3.15
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Reher and Iriso-Napal split their provincial data set into separate urban and rural 
subsets, so that no direct comparison with their findings can be made.  
In this application we shall stick to a single data set for each of the countries and 
enter urbanization as a variable, rather than using it for splitting up the data. But, more 
importantly, we shall opt for a different analysis strategy altogether, with the aim of 
eliminating the multicollinearity problem in the estimation of the net effects of 
determinants.  
In the analysis so far, a clearer picture of the FDT and SDT dimensions could be 
obtained by subjecting the various indicators to a Principal Components Analysis. By 
imposing an orthogonal design of factor extraction, uncorrelated dimensions could be 
obtained which prove to have very clear interpretations. Now, exactly the same strategy 
will be followed for the independent variables. The extracted factors or dimensions will 
also be uncorrelated between themselves, and the standardized regression coefficients 
(betas) of such uncorrelated predictors will be identical to the original zero order 
correlation coefficients. On the other hand, a factor may capture two strongly correlated 
features, such as industrialization and secularization or education and Catholicism. In 
such instances the effects of these two cannot be estimated separately. What we get is 
the effect of the synergy of the two together.
11
 
 
 
5.1 The principal components of the independent variables sets in Belgium and 
Spain 
In the Belgian example 22 indicators of structural, social, and cultural determinants of 
the FDT and SDT could be reduced to four main orthogonal dimensions while retaining 
80% of the total variance of the indicators. In the Spanish example six orthogonal 
components were needed to capture 78% of the total variance contributed by 27 
indicators. The factors and their main indicators are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for the 
two countries respectively. The values between parentheses are the factor loadings or 
the zero order correlation coefficient between the factor and the indicator concerned. 
  
                                                          
11 There are generally very good historical reasons that explain such combinations of determinants, and these 
can be made explicit through a more detailed narrative rather than through purely statistical causal modeling.  
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Table 5: The four orthogonal dimensions of the socio-economic and cultural 
predictors in 42 Belgian arrondissements and the factor loadings of 
the indicators (r) 
Factor 1. Urbanity .  Factor 2: Secularization and 
pre-World War I subsistence 
agriculture. 
 Factor 3: Literacy.  Factor 4: Advancement 
female education after World 
War II 
Percent population 
urban 1890 (%urb) 
0.734  
Vote for secular 
parties 1958 
0.938  
Literacy levels 
population 15+  (lit 
15+)1880 
0.947 
 Percent women in 
birth cohort 1931-35 
with complete 
secondary or higher 
education 
0.720 
% urb 1900 0.786  
Vote for secular 
parties 1919 
0.965  Lit 15+ 1890 0.942 
 Percent women in 
birth cohort 1961-65 
with tertiary education 
0.940 
% urb 1910 0.787  
Non-attendance 
Sunday Mass 1964 
0.895  Lit 15+ 1900 0.926 
 Ever worked women 
cohort 1931-35 
0.472 
% urb 1920 0.885  MLA-index 1881-1884 0.797  Lit 15+ 1910 0.933 
 Ever worked women 
cohort 1961-65 
0.572 
% urb 1930 0.880  
Percent male active 
population in 
agriculture (% male 
agr.) 1890 
-0.842    
 
  
% urb 1947 0.884  % male agr. 1900 -0.792    
 
  
% urb 1961 0.854  % male agr. 1910 -0.755    
 
  
% urb 1970 0.887  
Percent male active 
population in agr. and 
cottage industries 
1900 
-0.822    
 
  
Percent male active 
population in 
agriculture and 
cottage industries, 
1900 
-0.585       
 
  
percent population 
rural 1970  
-0.642       
 
  
 
Tables 7 and 8 show, for Belgium and Spain respectively, the results of OLS 
multiple regression. There is zero multicollinearity since the predictor dimensions are 
uncorrelated among themselves. 
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Table 6: The six orthogonal dimensions of the socio-economic and cultural 
predictors in 50 Spanish provinces and the factor loadings of the 
indicators (r ) 
Factor 1. Early industrialization.  Factor 2: Urbanity and service sector.  Factor 3: Land tenure – Minifundio vs 
Latifundio 
Percent male employment in 
industry (% male ind.) 1900 
0.643  
Percent population urban (% 
urb) 1900 
0.852  
Percent agricultural 
enterprises less than 1ha 
1986 
0.859 
% male ind. 1950 0. 585  % urb 1950 0.877  
Promille agricultural 
enterprises 100+ ha 1986 
-0.679 
Percent males in agriculture 
(% male agr.) 1887 
-0.412  
Percent employment in 
industry (% ind.) 1900 
0.587  
Average size agricultural 
enterprises 1962   
-0.659 
Percent diputados right parties 
elections 1933 
-0.520  % ind. 1950 0.528    
   Net migration rate 1887 0.443    
   
Percent employment in service 
sector 1995 
0.712    
   
Percent employment in 
agriculture 1995 
-0.793    
   Percent vote left 1977 0.724    
 
Factor 4. Historical literacy and 
Catholicism. 
 Factor 5: Traditional left  Factor 6: “New secularization” and 
contemporary female employment 
Percent population literate (% 
lit.) 1887 
0.829  
Percent diputados left parties 
1936 
0.804  
Percent civil marriages (% civil 
marr.) 2001  
0.900 
% lit. 1900 0.753  
Percent diputados right 
parties 1931 
-0.705  % civil marr. 2009 0.895 
Percent women 15 still illiterate 
1986 
-0.666  
Percent diputados left parties 
1931 
0.603  
Female employment rate 30-
34 in 2001 
0.903 
Percent women 16+ with 
tertiary education 2001 
0.617  Percent vote left 1977 0.377  
Female employment rate 25-
29 in 2001 
0.750 
Number of persons per 
clergyman 1887 
-0.634     
Percent women16+ with 
secondary educ. 2001  
0.691 
Percent diputados right parties 
elections 1933 
0.632     
Daily press circulation index 
1995  
0.756 
Index marriages Lent, 1900-01 -0.574     PNB per capita 1960  0.643 
Ratio patronos/non-patronos in 
agriculture 1920 
0.535     
Percent women 10+ still 
illiterate 1986  
-0.607 
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Table 7: The prediction of the three demographic dimensions in Belgian 
arrondissements on the basis of the four independent variable 
factors. Results from multiple regression: beta coefficients and 
adjusted R squared values 
N=42 FDT+SDT continuity: Fertility 
control + non-conformism 
family formation 
FDT: Historical illegitimate 
fertility (Ih) 
SDT: postponement  fertility. 
Urbanity .181* .578*** .188* 
Secularization and pre-WWI 
subsist. agriculture 
.840*** .413*** -.121 
Literacy .377*** -.437*** .167 
Advancement postwar female 
education 
.090 .167 .801*** 
Adj. R squared .873 .687 .691 
(R) ( .941) (.847) (.849) 
 
Note: *** p<.001 , **p<.01, *p<.05.  
 
Table 8: The prediction of the five demographic dimensions in Spanish 
provinces on the basis of the six independent variables factors. 
Results from multiple regression: beta coefficients and adjusted R 
squared values 
N=50 FDT: high 
marital fertility 
Ig 
FDT : earlier 
marriage Im 
FDT: higher 
non-marital 
fertility Ih 
SDT: 
postponement of 
unions & fertility 
SDT:  “non-
conformism” 
family formation 
Early 
industrialization 
-.313* -.097 -.235 -.023 -.177 
Urbanity -.096 .154 .412*** .005 .571*** 
Minifundio (vs 
latifundio) 
.071 -.585*** .096 -.312*** -.009 
 
High  historical 
literacy + 
Catholicism. 
.077 -.058 .222 .694*** -.302*** 
Traditional Left -.439*** .007 .264* -.195** -.091 
“New secular.” + 
high contem. 
female emplmt 
na na na .452*** .525*** 
 
Adj. R squared 
( R ) 
 
.233 
(.558) 
 
.309 
(.615) 
 
.279 
(.594) 
 
.797 
(.907) 
 
.695 
(.856) 
 
Note: *** p<.001 , **p<.01, *p<.05. na = not applicable (not a historical covariate). 
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The first major contrast between the countries is that the adjusted multiple 
correlation coefficients squared (or the proportions of the variance of the dependent 
dimension explained) are much higher for the spatial patterning of the FDT in Belgium 
than in Spain. For the SDT, however, there is no major distinction anymore in this 
respect, since the adjusted R-squared values for Spain have become much higher. In 
other words, the spatial patterns of the SDT dimensions in Spain are much better 
accounted for than those of the FDT. 
In both countries industrialization and urbanization have, not surprisingly, 
contributed to a faster historical marital fertility decline, to a more pronounced bulge in 
illegitimacy during the FDT, and to the stronger emergence of the “non-conformism” 
dimension of the SDT. Note, however, that the impact of the urbanity dimension on the 
Belgian first factor is not large. This is mainly due to the fact that the control of marital 
fertility started in several Walloon rural areas even before spreading to the industrial 
and urban areas.  
Just as important as these structural aspects was the dimension of secularization. In 
Belgium this was by far the strongest predictor of both behavioral “innovations”, i.e. 
adoption of deliberate fertility control (FDT) and adoption of non-conventional family 
formation patterns (SDT). In Spain, the old secularization pattern associated with the 
political Left was equally instrumental in speeding up the fertility transition, whereas 
the “new secularization” pattern accounts more strongly for the “non-conformity” part 
of the SDT. In both countries historical illegitimate fertility levels were also higher in 
more secularized areas. 
The impact of historical literacy levels in Belgium is noticeable when it comes to 
speeding up fertility control and reducing illegitimacy during the FDT, but it vanishes 
for the SDT postponement dimension. By contrast, the Spanish concordance of 
Catholicism with better education is a very strong one throughout the 20
th
 century, and 
it currently accounts for higher proportions of women with post-secondary education. 
Through this long historical chain, this factor has become the best predictor of the 
fertility postponement dimension of the SDT. In Belgium there was no such clear 
connection between religion and more advanced education, and the postponement 
dimension of the SDT is mainly explained by just female higher education and higher 
employment rates. 
Finally, a specific Spanish feature is that the spatial differences in nuptiality are 
partially accounted for by the minifundio-latifundio contrast. Regions with high rural 
population densities and a preponderance of small-scale agriculture had higher 
proportions of single women. This was further reinforced by high male outmigration, a 
sex imbalance, and concomitant unfavorable marriage markets for women. In Belgium 
the gradual weakening of the Malthusian late marriage pattern was mainly associated 
with the growth of urban and industrial wage sectors, but sex imbalances played a 
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similar role as in Spain, i.e. more unfavorable marriage conditions for the 
overrepresented gender. 
 
 
5.2 Conclusions: Back to the RWA paradigm 
The RWA-model of demographic change essentially implies that new forms of 
behavior will mainly develop spatial patterns that will mirror the “Willingness” 
condition if such forms of behavior run counter to pre-existing moral or ethical codes of 
conduct. The practice of deliberate contraception (FDT), and then much later also the 
replacement of legal marriage by cohabitation and concomitant parenthood within such 
cohabiting unions (SDT), were two such demographic innovations that challenged 
moral conventions and religious doctrine. Hence the normal outcome should be that 
these two features of FDT and SDT respectively should mirror the map of 
secularization. And since the latter had clearly crystallized by 1880 in both Spain and 
Belgium, then it is perfectly logical that the maps of the onset of fertility control (FDT) 
and of the rise of cohabitation (SDT) in these countries should be affected by the 
subsequent evolution of secularization. The empirical investigation presented here for 
the two countries indicates that this has indeed been the case, and quite strongly so. But 
there is still a difference between the two countries. In Belgium the regional pattern of 
secularization has remained very stable ever since the end of the 19
th
 century, and as a 
result the “non-conformist” part of the SDT follows in the footsteps of the historical 
marital fertility transition. In Spain the secularization map changed after the Franco 
period with the growth of the “peripheral arc” as a continuous zone of high 
secularization and the disappearance from it of Andalusia. Consequently, the old 
secularization map predicts the historical marital fertility decline, whereas the new 
secularization map predicts the “non-conformist” dimension of the SDT. To sum up, in 
both countries the correlation with secularization remains through time, but in Belgium 
this occurs within the context of stable differentials and in Spain within the context of 
changing spatial patterns of secularization.  
The fertility postponement ingredient of the SDT provides an illustration of a very 
different outcome. Waiting to have children till later, i.e. until education is completed or 
until a sustainable standard of living is reached, does not run counter to any moral or 
ethical prescripts. In fact quite the opposite is true (and has been true in the West even 
before Malthus defined his “prudent” marriage rules). Hence the limiting condition for 
this aspect of the SDT should not be related to the “Willingness” factor (moral code) in 
the RWA model. Rather, postponement of parenthood should reflect socio-economic 
conditions, and hence be influenced mainly by structural economic constraints, captured 
by the “Readiness” condition. This seems to be exactly the case with the spatial pattern 
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of the SDT fertility postponement in both countries, as shown by the strong spatial 
correlation between parenthood postponement and female higher education and labor 
force participation. In other words, the outcome is no longer reflecting the leads and 
lags with respect to a moral and religious dimension, but much more reproducing the 
map of structural socio-economic conditions. The outcome is that fertility 
postponement is a newer feature, not dependent on moral legitimation, and therefore 
spatially uncorrelated with the spread of cohabitation in both countries examined here. 
The long-term effect of female literacy, and later on of female higher education, on 
fertility postponement during the SDT is a specific additional Spanish feature. 
The “Ability” condition has not been considered in the present analysis. But this 
does not mean that it is unimportant or unrelated to the dimensions studied here. For 
one, the availability of contraceptive methods, access to safe abortion, or the possibility 
of making contracts between cohabiting partners are three issues that are all ultimately 
settled at the political level. In both Belgium and Spain Catholic conservatism hindered 
the sale of contraceptives for decades and dramatically opposed abortion. By contrast, 
secular parties opened the way for free access to these methods and furthermore made 
legal provisions to accommodate cohabitation and even same sex marriage. Hence, the 
secularization dimension pops up in the “Ability” condition as well, and very forcefully 
so in the two countries considered here. 
Finally, Spain and Belgium share another striking feature: language borders are 
capable of demarcating separate areas of diffusion of new forms of behavior. For 
Belgium this is a bipolar division, and for Spain a multipolar one. Moreover, these 
demarcations are best visible with regard to both the fertility decline of the FDT and the 
“non-conformity” dimension of the SDT. Very often the same divisions emerge with 
respect to secularization as well. This configuration is very visible in Belgium with the 
Walloon-Flemish language border showing up each time these dimensions are 
considered. Wallonia is simply systematically ahead with respect to fertility control 
(FDT), rise of cohabitation, and parenthood among cohabitants (SDT), and this 
corresponds to a long history of earlier and stronger secularization. In Spain a similar 
role is played by the Catalan-Valencian linguistic zone. All the provinces in this area 
(Catalonia, Comunidad Valenciana, Baleares Islands) tend to move together as an 
“avant-garde” with respect to marital fertility decline and the SDT dimension of non-
conformist family formation. The entire zone is equally always present in both the old 
secularization and new secularization maps. The Andalusian, Galician, and Basque 
areas equally have their particularisms that set them apart from the Spanish core, made 
up of the two Castiles and Extremadura, but the division along the demographic 
dimensions is not as systematic as in the case of the Catalan-Valencian area. 
Nevertheless, it comes as no surprise that, back in 1961, William Leasure’s professor of 
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Spanish in Princeton thought that Leasure had drawn up a map of Spanish languages, 
when in fact he was presenting a map of the Spanish fertility transition. 
In a nutshell, the main conclusions are: 
 
(i) Regional differences with respect to the manifest control of fertility within 
marriage (FDT) and “non-conformist” patterns of household formation (SDT) tend to 
mirror the maps of secularization, and are hence especially conditioned by the 
“Willingness” factor (W). By contrast the fertility postponement aspect of the SDT 
reflects spatial patterns of female education and employment, and is consequently 
essentially conditioned by the “Readiness” factor  (R). These generalizations hold in 
both countries. 
(ii) However, in Belgium spatial continuity from FDT to SDT is linked to the 
country’s stable pattern of secularization, whereas in Spain the conditioning element of 
long-term continuity has been first female literacy and subsequently the growth of 
female education.  
(iii) The two sub-dimensions of the SDT, i.e. “non-conformist” family formation 
and fertility postponement, are not nearly as interconnected as originally assumed by 
the SDT theory. This not only emerges in Belgium and Spain but was also clearly in 
evidence for the counties of the USA (Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2006) and shows up 
again in the regions of Latin America (Esteve et al. 2012). The reason for this seems to 
be the connection of the two demographic sub-dimensions to the different conditioning 
factors mentioned above (W versus R). 
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Appendices 
Map A1:  Linguistic and administrative map of Belgium (provinces, 
arrondissements) 
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Map A2: Linguistic map of Spain  
 
 
Source: García Mouton, P. 1994 : Lenguas y dialectos en España. Editorial Arco Libros, Madrid. 
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Map A3:  Administrative map of Spain (Comunidades Autónomas and 
provinces) 
 
 
Notes: (1) Andalucía: Almería; Cádiz; Córdoba; Granada; Huelva; Jaén; Málaga; Sevilla. (2) Aragón: Huesca; Teruel; Zaragoza. 
(3) Asturias, Principado de. (4) Balears, Illes. (5) Canarias: Las Palmas; Santa Cruz de Tenerife. (6) Cantabria.(7) Castilla y 
León: Ávila; Burgos; León; Palencia; Salamanca; Segovia; Soria; Valladolid; Zamora. (8) Castilla- La Mancha: Albacete; 
Ciudad Real; Cuenca; Guadalajara; Toledo. (9) Cataluña: Barcelona; Girona; Lleida; Tarragona. (10) Comunitat Valenciana: 
Alicante/Alacant; Castellón/Castelló; Valencia/València. (11) Extremadura: Badajoz; Cáceres. (12) Galicia: A Coruña; Lugo; 
Ourense; Pontevedra. (13) Madrid, Comunidad de. (14) Murcia, Región de. (15) Navarra, Comunidad Foral de. (16) País 
Vasco: Araba/Álava; Bizkaia; Gipuzkoa. (17) Rioja, La.ga. 
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